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At the start of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, targeting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the defining feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and conflict resolution—even as this fits with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson echoed this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but observers warn it is too soon to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Strains

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Selective Intervention

An analogous confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.